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We do not know where we are going
But we are on our way.
Stephen Vincent Benet
rrWestern star"
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Introduction
The focus of my interest for a practicuum was social
work methodology.

When I first talked with Dr. Breedlove

concerning my practicuum we agreed that I should do library
research regarding social work as a problem oriented, as
opposed to a procedure oriented, practice.

My subsequent

library work focused upon the question most fundamental to
effective social work practice:

How is the problem defined?

What was the value position underlying the definition?
Numerous practice models exist within the profession
of social work.
than another.

No one can prove that one 1s more effective
If one model can demonstrate that it has a

statistically higher success rate it is still unable to link
cause with effect:

it cannot show what it was in treatment

that made the outcome better.

One of the problems is that

evaluative research has not proven to be an effective tool
for the

~pplied

social sciences •. How could the researcher"

-evaluate when neither the problem nor the outcome have been
minimally defined, much less operationallzed?

Even more

basic to evaluative research is the definition of the under
lying value assumptions.

How, for example, was the decision

made that the client was "improved" as a result of therapy?
Whose relativ,e definition of health/illness was utilized?

2

The position assumed in this paper 1s that whether
a worker selects one practice model over another is
basically a value quest10n.

There are some unique and·dia

metrically opposed value pOSitions assumed within the
social sciences, and it is imperative that workers under
stand what these positions are so that they know where they
are going.

This paper will focus upon the value pOSitions

underlying two social work models:

/

the traditional or psy-

I

chodynam1c and that of behavior modification.

It is recog

nized that there are areas in which those twa approaches do
not seem far removed, e.g., with some neo-behaviorists
and/or some ego psychologists.

However, to the extent that

the lines become very blurred, so does the clar1ty of posi
tion or practice.
n ec1ectic,"

Like many practitioners who claim to be

it becomes extremely difficult to find out

where they are and what they do value at a given point in
time.

Why do social workers become so caught up in treat

ment facts?

Because they have npt clearly defined what they

value and where those values lead them.
In order to demonstrate that the profession of social
work has moved from pos'ition to position, this paper will
first sketch briefly the early history of social casework.
Second, the paper will focus upon some of the baSic dangers
involved in "borrowing" from the knowledge of other disci
plines.

.'

Finally, two major practice models, the traditional

.

:,

3
model and the behavior modification model will be described
both in terms of their nature and development and in terms
of their conflictual value positions.

Social workers need

to be cautious not only to identify the values from which
they are operatfng, but also to be certain that their posi
tions are not too narrow or simplistic for the effective
dealing with life.

4
A Brief History of Social Work Practice
Grace Coyle once noted that, "Social work has always
been dominated by two factors:

the social climate in which

1t moves and the state of the sciences on which it is
dependent. III

This being true some thirty years hence, it

1s necessary to understand not only the social work litera
ture, but the zeitgeist which has continued to alter the
emphasis and direction of social work effort.
Early in the twentieth century social work, influ
enced both philosophically by pragmatism and soc1ally and
politically by the Progressive era, was in what has been
termed the sociolog1cal stage:

a stage which centered upon

the conviction that manls life experience was env1ron
mentally determined.

Pragmatism drew away from the Puritan

belief that man's problems were

d~e

to moral inadequacy and

toward the recognition that many of man's problems could be
traced to his environmento

"Reform the environment in the

service of the individual was the battle cry.

The method

proposed was the use of the social sciences, especially
sociology.,,2

Thus social workers directed their efforts at

lGrace L. Coyle, "Social Work at the Turn of the
Decade," Proceedings of the National Conference of Social
Work (1940), p. 12.
2Nathan Edward Cohen, Social Work in the American
Tradition (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1958).
p.

314.

../
•
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mod1fioation of

~he

milieu.

Suoh intervention inoluded

things like child plaoement, ne1ghborhood houses, separating
indiv1duals within families, and changing jobs. 3
This, then, was the sooial climate of the early nine
teen hundreds, but the other faotor was of equal import:
the state of the soiences.

Newton was, and continues to be,

the theoretical giant; and social work was opt1mistic that
the key to prevention and cure would lie in such soientific
laws and methods. 4 Not only were social workers in need of
a scientific knowledge base for their profession, but there
was also the omnipresent belief that science would oure all
soc1al 1lls and lead to unlimited progress.

Exemplary of

this belief was the development of the Charity Organization
Societies, in the 1870's, for the purpose of making charity,
or almsgiving, scientific and efficient.
In 1889 a paper entitled "Scientific Charity" by
Mrs. Glendower Evans (National Conference of Charities
and Corrections Proceedings l889:24} likened the appli
cation of SCience to charity to the use of a physician
in illness, ~rging that the same intelligence and
scientific spirit which created power over the phYSie~l
world be used to understand and modify social forces.
3Gordon J. Aldridge, liThe Influence of Freud on
Social Work," Mental Hygiene, Vol. 42, No.2 '(1958), pp.
284-288.
4Carel Germain, "Casework & SCience: A Historical
Enoounter," in Theories of Social Casework, ed. by Robert
W. Roberts, Robert H. Nee (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1970), p. 8.

5Ibid •

'
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Ma£Y

Richmond:

Social Diagnosis

It was with Mary Richmond's publication of Social
r'

I.

i'

Diagnosis in 1917 that the foundation was laid for a scien
tific approach to casework. 6

Social diagnosis was comprised

of the definition of the social situation and the perscon
r

!

h

ality of the client.

This diagnosis, arrived at by a pro

cess of collecting and evaluating information and drawing

I

inferences, was conceived of as a procedure common to all
casework.
,"

Miss Richmond, writing in the period described

above as "sociological,1I stressed the situational aspects of
the case:

the history gathering was emphasized with the

belief that if enough facts were collected the problem's
solution would be forthcoming.

There were two key concepts

to Miss Richmond's philosophy:

that there were differences

between and among individuals, and that man is a product of
his social relationshlps.7

Social work's basic aim, from

Mary Richmond's perspective was the development of person
ality.

Casework consisted "of those processes which develop

6Charlotte Towle, "Social Casework,tr Social Work
Yearbook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947) in
Carel Germain, Ibid., p. 9.

7Irma Stein (unpublished paper, New York School of,
Social Work, in Cohen, ~. cit., pp. 131-132.

,

7
personali ty through adjustment's consciously effected, indi
vidual by individual, between men and their social environ
ment. u8
At the time when Miss Richmond was writing, social
work was beginning to feel the impact of psychia.try.

Albei t

Freudian theory was not yet dominant, Richmond did lean
heavily on the "social psychiatric" writings of Adol:ph Meyer
of Johns Hopkins university.9

It is notable that in 1911

Dr. Meyer read a paper on HCase Work in Social Service
and Medical and Social Cooperation in Nervous and Mental Dis
eases.'110 Also in some cities,
• • • psychiatrists were members of case conferences,
and contributed not only to the method of understanding
clients, but also to the education of the professional
staff. The influence had been only rarely felt before
the war; but after 1918 1t became essential for anyone
practicing in the field of social casework to under
stand the dynamic functions of the emotions. ll
Influenced by psychiatry, social work was then con
currently influenced by medicine.

Mary Richmond, for

example, not only quoted frequently from William Osler, the

8 Mary E. Richmond, What is Social Casework? (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1922), p. 98.
9 Barbu Valer, review of trThe Commonsense Psychiatry
of Adolph Meyer," in American Journal of Psychoanalysis,
1950, p. 71j V. Meyer and Edward s. Chesser, Behavior ~nerapy
in Clinical Psychiatry (New York: Science House, Inc.,
1970), p. 14; Frank J. Bruno, Trends in Social Work 1874-1956
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 187, 284.
lOBruno, 2£. cit., p. 183.
llIbid., p. 187.
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famous Johns Hopkins surgeon, but two of her closest ad
visors were prominent physicians.
It seems reasonable to suppose that these many asso
ciations contributed to her development of the medical
or disease metaphor of social diagnosis and treatment.
It was during the Baltimore years that she wrote, for
example, of pauperism as Ita disease" and of the friendly
visitor as a "social" physician or general practitioner
of charity who is called upon to "heal" complex condi
tions. 12
.
This medical, or disease model, was one by which the
individual's behavior was considered peculiar, abnormal or
··diseased, because of some underlying cause j the analogy
being made, of course, to medicine in which lesions, germs,
viruses and other insults foreign to the normal working of
the organisms lead to symptom production. 13
Psychiatric influence was not as apparent 1n Social
Diagnosis, which gave equal time to the "inner" ·and "outer"
factors affecting personality development, as it was in
12
Muriel Pumphrey, "Mary Richmond and the Rise of
Professional Social Work in Baltimore," DSW dissertation,
Columbia University School of Social Work, Univer~ity Micro
films Publication.#17,076, Ann Arbor, Michigan, in Germain,
~o cit., pp. 12-13.
l3Leonard P. Ullman and Leonard Krasner, Case Studies
1n Behavior Modification (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win
ston, 1965), p. 12; L. B. Thorpe and B. Katz, The Psychology
of Abnormal Behavior (New York: Ronald, 1948), pp. 161-162,
166; N. A. Cameron, Personalit Develo ment an~ Psycho ath- ,
ology (Boston: Houghton Miff~in Company, 19 3 ,p. 52;
A. P. Noyes and L. C. Kolb, Modern Clinical Psychiatry, 5th
ed. (Philadelphia: Saunder, 1958), p. 96.

1
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other social work realms.

Three outstanding attempts were

1
I

I

1

made prior to the 1930's to establish a generic base for
casework.

The first was Mary Richmond's Social Diagnosis

The second was the paper

pre~ented

by Mary Jarrett at the

National Conference of Social Work in 1919 entitled, "The
Psychiatric Thread Running Through All Social Case Work."
The third was the emphasis in the 1929 Milford Conference
Report which tended to limit casework to "the adjustment of
the deviant individual to his environment. rr14 Thus sQcial
casework which had been accused by Abraham Flexner in 1915
of having no transmissible knowledge and skill of its own
was embracing the new developments of psychiatry:

a medical

model, and with it, a study-diagnosis-treatment framework,.15
Social Factors
Many social factors were operating in favor of adop
tion of the psychiatric model.

Workers in medical settings

seeking professional status were anxious to differentiate
themselves from nurses and other staff; by identifying with
the higher status profession of medicine, with the physi
cian's body of knowledge and his method of diagnosis and
14Cohen,

~.

cit., p. 140.

l5Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Indus
trial Society and Social Welfare (New York: The Free Press,
1958), p. 1 77 •

I

~"

,...,
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16

treatment, s;ocial wo:rk status was enhanced.
same period 'mental

hea~th

During this

settings were receiving the im

pact of the ,mental hygiene movement.

Clifford Beerls book,

A Mind Tha t 'Found Itself, gave strong impetus to the already
burgeoning lnterest in the indiVidual qua individual.
With the opening of Smith College1s training school
for psychiatric social workers, social work both responded
to the need for trained workers to handle the emotional
problems of 'returning World War I veterans and relatives,
and it established precedent for a psychiatric training
model.

The following notice of opening appeared:

On J~ly 8, 1918, Smith College and the Boston Psy
chopathic Hospital, under the auspices of the National
Committee of Mental Health, will open at Smith College
a train~ng school for psychiatric social workers to
assist fn the rehabilitation of soldiers·suffering from
shell-shock and other nervous disorders. 1 7
This announcement marked the culmination of the dream of
Miss Mary Jarrett and Dr. Ernest Southard to establish "a
profession School which would emphasize the importance of
,,18
social work in the practice of psychiatry •
• •

l6Roy Lubov, Professional Altruist, ch. 2 "From
Friendly Visiting to Social Diagnosis," in Germain, op. cit.,
p. 13.
17Elizabeth L. Grover, "History and Philosophy of
Social Welfare, 1918-1932" (unpublished paper,. New York
School of Social Work, April 1956, in Cohen, ~. cit., pp.
132-133.
18Cohen, op. cit., p. 133.
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During World War I, social workers were not only
responding to the emotional needs of veterans, but to the
increasing interest of psychiatry, psychology and biology
in the psychological aspects of human behavior.

Typical of

this interest in the United States was the "home service
divisions" of the American Red Cross.
shortage~

Because of tl:le war

of psychiatrists, social workers, supervised by

psychiatrists, were given substantial responsibility in the
treatment of psychoneurotic patients.
Following World War I the nation turned within
itself.

It refused to accept the growing interdependence of

the world and instead turned to isolationism.

Concurrent

with the end of the war was the demise of the Progressive
·era, and the national concern for social reform.

Social

reform, for social workers, was both out of fashion, and
often politically dangerous; therefore social work turned to
working more intenSively with the individual and to sharpen
ing its technical skil1. l9
In summary, social work shifted, to use Porter Leels
t·erms, from a preoccupation with ffcause" to a preoccupation
with "function."

It must be born in mind that this turn

19E• Pumpian-M1ndlin, "The Position of Psychoanalysis
in Relation to the Biological and Social Sciences," in Psy
choanalysis as Science (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1952), pp. 133-134, in Cohen, ~. cit., pp. 317-319.
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1nward was not unique to social work.

The post war twenties

brought a "cu1turewide interest in the unique inner world
of individual experience. U20 Important is the fact that
soc1a1 work practice reflected the spirit of the times.
The Impact of Freud
Sigmund Freud offered to social work a behavioral
theory which accounted for all the data of human behavior,
its development, and its pathological deviations.

Albeit

'Freud was formulating a specific, while general, theory
he remained in contact with the concrete details of life so
that his general set of postulates and assumptions had high
applicability.
Freud's theoretical relationship to the so-called
medical model is straightforward.
medicine:

physiology.

His first training was in

The following account taken from

Freud's major professor's lecture briefly describes his "edu
cational orientation:

.

Physiology is the science of organisms as such.
Organisms differ from dead material entities in action-
machines in possessing the faculty of assimilation, but
they are all phenomena of the physical world; systems
of atoms, moved by forces, according to the principle
of the conservation of energy discovered by Robert
Mayer in 1842, neglicted for 20 years, and then popular
ized by He1mho1tz. 2
20

Germain, op. cit., p. 16.
21 E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol.
I (New York: Basic Books, 1953), pp. 41-45.
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Jones went on to say:
It has often been assumed that Freud's psychological
theories date from his contact with Charcot or Breuer
or even later. On the contrary, it can be shown that
the principles on which he constructed his theories
were those he had a~~uired as a medical student under
Brucke's influence.
Most important for social work practice was not
Freud's metapsychology, but the inSights which he provided
regarding the nature of man:

Social influence in early life

1s most important because the basic personality structure is
laid down during the first six years of life.

Man is moti

vated by his instincts (life and death) and 1s continually
engaged 1n work1ng w1th his 1nstinctual conflicts; there
fore, all behavior is not rational because 1t is rooted 1n
the 1rrational emotions.

Much behavior is not conscious and

is therefore not amenable to "direct ll influence.
Therapy based upon Freudian insight adheres to the
basic idea that motives dictate behavior.

This means, for'

one thing, that disordered behavior is the result of pecul
iarities inside the individual. 23

Following the' medical

22Ibid .; Gr.egory Zilboorg and George W. Henry, A
Hl'story oTMedical Psychology (New York: W. W. Norton-and
Co., 1941), 1n Herbert Bisno, The Philosophy of Social Work,
(Wash1ngton, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1952), p. 87.
.

1

23Gordon J. Aldridge, "The Influence of Freud on
Social Work," Mental Hygiene, Vol. 42, No.2 (1958), pp.
284-288.

I

I

J.
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model, the therapist must seek out the

inne~

states that

underl1e the surface d1ff1culties and by bringing them to
light, loosen the bond between them and the disordered be
havior they produce; the therapist attempts to lead the
patient to some "insight" regarding the relationship between
his motivations and his behavior. 24 Insight means under
standing:

if the client understands the basis of his be

havior, then that behavior is more meaningful.

The client,

gaining insight, is not only freed from disabling symptoms,
but his life is made more meaningful.

Perry London de

scribed the technic of "insight therapy" as,
• • • essentially a systematization of the Socratic
teaching method, in which a person's • • • 1deas,
attitudes and feelings are probed, challenged and
queried (by the teacher, doctor, manipulator) until
they are either confirmed, reformulated or rejected.
Called "maieutics" by Platonic philosophers, the
method supposedly draws out of a person only things
that are already within him; this would mean that any
conclusions he comes to are ultimately under his own
responsibility • • • • In its purest forms, insight
therapy is more a guided dialogue of the patient with
himself than a substantive discussion with another
person .• 25
Psychoanalytic theory, therefore, offered rich in
sights, and a kind of treatment technique which met the
needs of a profession seeking methods oriented to individ

24 J .. C. Coleman, Abnormal Ps cholo y and Modern Life,
2nd ed1tion (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 195 , p. 225.
25per~ London, Behavior Control (New York:
and Row, 1969), pp. 58-59.

Harper
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ualized service. 26

The selection of Freudian theory was not

without difficulties.

Psychoanalysts, for example, had to

undergo extensive training in order to acquire their skill,
whereas social workers applying the same insights often
launched into such difficult areas of interpretation without
-the necessary

knowle~ge

of underlying thoughts and feelings.

However, as a direct result of the impact of Freudian psy
choanalysis in the 1920's and 1930's diagnostic social work
theory was formulated and taught by

the~aculty

of such

leading schools as the New York School of Social Work, the
University of Chicago School of Social Service Administra
tion, and Smith College School of Social Work. 27
Social casework has incorporated and taught from
many assumptions derived from Freudian theory.

Caseworkers

usually work fr.om the assumption that maladaptive behavior
is a surface symptom of an underlying emotional dis
order. 28 Also the importance of family relationship in
26Germain, 2£. cit., p. ~Q.
27Ruth E. Smalley, liThe Functional Approach to Case
work Practice," in Theories of Social Casework, ed. by
Robert W. Roberts, Robert H. Nee {Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 83.

28 Max Bruck, "Behavior Modification Theory and Prac
tice: A Critical Review," Social Work, Vol. 13, No.2
(April 1968), p. 39; Florence Hollis, If • • • And What Shall
We Teach? The Social Work Educator and Knowledge," Social
Service Review 42 (June 1968) pp. 184-96.

h
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the development of the individual, especially during the
earliest years, has been accepted by social work practi
tioners:29
All social workers must recognize that the family
as a unit of interacting personalities is the primary
institution in the formation of personality and charac
ter.30
Social work's individualizing emphasis in casework was
derived as much from psychoanalytic thought as from demo
cratic-Judeo-Christian ideas. 31 Freid1ander states that:
Caseworkers must be able to use skillfully the
knowledge of human behavior In stressful situations.
Such knowledge is to be found in psychological theories
on the structure, development and functioning of the
ego and its manifest expressions in the persona1ity.3 2
Or to quote other socla1 work literature:
Along with this recognition of the complexity of
human motivation there is an understanding of the
purposive and symptomatic nature of overt behavior.

29Virginia Robinson, A Changing Psychology in Social
Case Work (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North
Carolina Press, 1930), p. 34.
30He1en I. Clarke, Princi les and Practice of
Work (New York: D. Appleton Century Company, Inc.,
p:tf20.
31 Germaln, ~. c1t., p. 18 •
32Walter A. Friedlander, Concepts and Methods of
Social Work (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Rall,
Inc. ), p. 21.

17
In other words overt behavior is the result of certain ll
uneeds" which motIvate it; the behavior is the "symptom
of these tfcauses."33
Numerous other examples could easily be drawn from the lit
erature, but sufrice it to say that Freudian-theory has had,
and continues to have, a profound impact upon tbe social
work profession.
What is Generic Social Work?
The position taken in this paper agrees with Alfred
Kahn's statement that, liThe unifying conceptual key to all
social work method has not yet been identified • • • "3 4

To

cite an instance, because psychoanalytic concepts have been
so extensively incorporated into social work a great deal of
the professional literature has concerned itself with dif
ferentiating the function of the psychiatrist and the social
worker.

Lucille Austin states that cases suitable for case

work are those in which the client is able to focus upon
social adjustment and relationships; client's needing to
deal with psychological content would be treated via psy
chotherapy.35

Judd Marmor disagrees with Miss Austin.

He

33Bisno, 2E. cit., p. 21.
34Alfred J. Kahn, ed., liThe Function of Social Work
1n the Modern World," Issues in American Social Work (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 7.
35Lucille N. Austin, "Relationships BetweE;n Family
Agencies and Mental Health Clinics," Social Casework (1955)
36:51-59.
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states that her distinctions are not valid and that rrboth
approaches must· consider intrapsychic as well as social
factors. '.' 36
The current trend within social work,

~nd

the one

upon which behavior therapy has capitalized, is more con
sIstent with Miss Austin1s position than it is with Mar
l

mor's.

Social work, in an attempt to establish a unique

identity, has turned to a more pronounced focus in the tra
ditional role of the social worker as the expert in all
social aspects. 37

Justin Simon adheres to this emphasis in

his pronouncement that the essence of social work is in the
word "social" and its complex ramifications. 38
Social Work Values:

What Are They?

Numerous authors have dealt with the subject of
social work values. 39

However, the basic issue of the under

36Judd Marmor, "Indications for psychiatric therapy
or social casework," Social Casework (1955) 36:60-63.
37Alfred Kadushin, "The Knowledge Base of Social ~
Work," in Alfred Kahn, ed., Issues in American Social Work
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 63-64.
38Justin Simon, "Toward a Psychoanalytic Definition
of Social Casework," Social Service Review (1962) 36:1-12.
39Smalley, ~. cit., p. 121; Friedlander, £E. cit.,
pp. 2-6; Florence Hollis, Casework, A Psychosocial Therapy
(New York: Random House, 1965), p. 12; Bisno, 2£. cit.,
pp. 10-11; Swithun Bowers, OMI, "The Nature and Definition
of Social Casework," Journal of Social Casework (1940).

n

..
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lying importance of professional values has been given scant
attention. 40

According to casework-critic Elizabeth

Salomon (1967), the casework process has two fundamental
parts, the personal intuitive and empathic and the scien
tific.

She says that although it is difficult in our cu1

ture, the caseworker must have an increased consciousness
that the two parts intersect in the professional relation
ship.

Miss Salomon described the two philosophical positions

as that of positivism (the philosophical system dealing only
with positive facts and phenomena, rejecting abstract specu
lation) and humanism (any system of thought or action prin

l
)

I
I

cipally or exclusively concerned with human interests and
val;ues).
Some workers within the profession feel that if there
1s a conflict between the scientific, or positivistic,
values and humanitarian values, that the humanitarian values
would be the ones to be discarded. 41 If, in fact, this is
how the conflict is resolved, social work may shift from its

40This' paper is following K1uckhohn 1 s definition of
value, 1951, p. 395, as rra conception, explicit or impliCit,
distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group,
of the deSirable, which influences the selection from avail
able modes, means and ends of action."

41 Barbara Varley, "Social Work Values:

Changes in
Value Commitments of Students from Admission to M.S.W. Gradu
atl.on," Journal of Education for Social Work, Vol. 4, No.2
(Fall 1968), pp. 67-76.

I~
J
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I

primary humanitarian values of the dignity and the right of
each individual to full development of his capac1ties, the
interdependence of individuals and their consequent respons
ibility toward each other in the framework of their capaci
ties.

For according to the positivistic point of view:

With its credo of a new enlightenment, its cult of
objectivity and its empirical methodo10gy--the currency
of the world of Freud and Richmond--the world is dis
coverable and knowable. Its scientific method, induc
tion, consists of breaking down natural objects into
their characteristic elements and then elaborating
these elements into types--or concepts, Judgments, con
clusions and theories. Most Significant, the inductive
method of positivism holds that a real world can be
observed and that the observer can be divorced from what
he' observe s. 42
f

There is considerable agreement that the general
values held by the social work profession are unclear, if
indeed they are existent.

Ernest F. Witte stated that:

The corroding influence of the materialistic society
in which social work is practiced appears:to change the
behavior and values of social workers and make their
response more nearly like that of the general public
despite professed goals which would suggest a different
pattern. zt 3

42Elizabeth L.· Salomon, "Humanistic Values and Social
Casework," Social Casework, Vol. XLVIII No. 1 (January 1967)
p. 27.
i

43Ernest F. Witte, fI Student Wisdom and Values: The
Positive Force of Disaffection," Social Work Values in an Age
of Discontent, ed. b¥ Katherine A. Kendall, New York Council
on Social Work (1970), p. 95.

·21

Ruby B. Parnell concurs with Mr. Witte:
American social work, both as an expression and
instrument of American social and moral values, is
inextricably tied up with what America is at anyone
period of time and this tends to reflect the major con
cerns of the era. We have moved as toe times demanded
or permitted from a commitment to charity, to a commit
ment to justice, to a commitment to science • • • • Com
passion, social justice and disciplined knowledge are
all part 0440ur armamentarium, though we fall short in
all three.
The main implication of this confusion regarding profeSSional
values is that individual ·workers do not

determi~e

their

diverse value selections by standards of their profeSSion,
but by such things as their cultural and family background,
the precepts and demands of a given group, their own per
sonal· experience, and/or in terms of some

soc1al~:scientific

theory regarding human behavior.
The positivist might well argue that the issue of
values is of little import:
objective.

after all the therapist can be

However, numerous studies have demonstrated that

the observer cannot be divorced from what he observes.

Be

haviorists might argue for their "objectivity" on the ground
that they are able to make decisions, to diagnose and formu
late treatment plans, without ever being subjectively

44Ruby B. Pernell, "Social Work Values on the New

Frontiers," Social Work Values in an Age or Discontent,
edt by Katherine A. Kendall, New York, Council on Social
Work Ed. (1970), p. 51.
y
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involved.

It must be pointed out that their "objective

theory," their principles and concepts, have been va11dated
only because they have been seen as ngood,1f via subjective
Judgments of a 'number of peers.

Further~

treatment is

always directed toward a goal which has been Judged as
"good" by someone.

Usually the therapist is the one who

determines the goal as being one of "better social adapta
tion" or the like.

Does not the Judgment of what behavior

is "adaptlve tl necessarily imply a value judgment?

Adaptive

in terms of middle class ethiCS, democracy, in terms of the
continuation of the social "status quo," individual happi
ness, mankind, survival, development of the species, art and
creativity, encouragement of genius or of mediocrity and
conformity?
The therapist does not work independently of an
assumed value pOSition.

Casework is a social ,situation in

which therapist and client respond in a system of mutual
influence.

Goldstein (1962) has brought together considerable

literature on this area.
have an

im~ortant

He demonstrated that expectations

effect upon how other's behavior will be

evaluated, and upon which behavior will be manifest.

For

example, there is an interdependence of the client's expec
tations of help and the likelihood of his being helped.
Also, the therapist may be influenced by how well he likes
the subject.

Self-fulfilling prophecy is frequently at work:

23
The therapist who evaluates the subject as a poor
risk for therapy will be less likely to establish good
rapport, which will increase the chances of failure,
and validate his original belief that the person was a
poor bet. Knowledge about social class, and intellec
tual and verbal abilities may all make the patient more
desirable for therapy and lead him to be assigned to a
more capable therapist. 5
\
Regardle'ss of how the therapist r s values are acq.uired,
the worker does train the patient to emit certain selected
IIcorrect" responses.

Marmor has described the results of

this process:
But what is insight? To a Freudian it means one,
thing, to a Jungian another, and to a Rankian, a Horney
ite, and Adlerian, or a Sullivanian, still: another.
Each school gives its own particular brand; of ins1ght.
Who shall say whose are the correct insigh~s? The fact
is that patients treated by analysts of all these schools
may not only respond favorably, but also believe strongly
1n the insights that they have been given. Even admit
tedly "inexact ll interpretatiops have been noted to be of
therapeutic value. Moreover, the problem is even more
complicated than this for, depending upon the point of
view of the analyst, the patients of each school seem
to bring up precisely the kind of phenomenological data
which confirm the theo~ies and interpretations of their 46
analyst. Thus, each theory tends to be self-validating.
Values are, therefore, basic to pract,ice.
must be more than an art based upon intuition.

Social work
It mus.t be

45Leonard P. Ullman and Leonard Krasner, Case Studies
1n Behavior Modification (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win
ston, 1965), p. 37.
46JUddMarmor, "Psychoanalytic Therapy as an Educa
tional Process" (Paper presented at Academy of Psychoanaly
SiS, Chicago, May, 1961, in J. H. Masserman, ed. Psycho- '
analytic Education (New York: Grune and Stratton, .1962) •
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based upon values and principles and an organized, eclectic

I
I
I

body of knowledge.

Because social work values have not been

f1rmly established, social work's claim to professional status
is Buspect.

Etzioni points out 1n his book The Semi

Professions that because social work failed to

distin~uish

itself as a profession, it has become a mere society of
technicians.

Etzioni states that social work practice is

not determined, as is the medical practice, by professional
standards or values, or by the patient1s problem, but by
the policy of the agency in which the social worker 1s
employed.

Social workers are best described as agents of

their particular system.

Unfortunately, the question of the

social worker's identity can best be addressed if we first
know something of the individual worker's personal back
ground and values, his social scientific preference and the
agency in which he works.
Should Social Work Borrow Knowledge From the Social Sciences?
There is hardly one national or state conference that
does not today have an appreciable segment of its program
devoted to consideration of the relationship of social
science theory and research to social work practice.
Ihstitutes and workshops with social science themes and
social science partiCipants are proliferating, schools
of social work are increasingly more cognizant of this
content in master's as well as doctoral programs, and
our journals reflect similar growing awareness. It is
pertinent to note also that trends within the field of
psychiatry have had some effect on social work in this
regard, as 1n so many others. It might be fair to say
that an even more intensive interaction with the social

I
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sciences has developed within psychiatry than within
social work., There is no escaping the conclusion that
the social sciences. are with us, and we cannot look to
psychiatry as a haven against these new winds that are
blowing our way. They are blowing just as strongly
within psychiatry. One may note, as illustrations,
several recent works that reflect the growing collabora
tion between psychiatrists and social scientists • • • •
The relevance of social science to social work may no
longer be questioned. What. is important is how we pre
pare ourselves to be selective and judicious about what
we choose to accept, how we choose to integrate and
a pP l y what we accept, and what we ourselves decide to
test. 47
Albeit it is acknowledged that social work is still a
long. way from having "a scientifically tested and validated
practice theory," social work is attempting to improve its
scientific approach with the use of the physical and the
social sciences. 48--

However, as the previous section pointed

out, social work I s historical emphasis upon goals', which are
derived from certain fundamental values, presents difficul
ties for the researcher.

When the worker applies scientific

knowledge he is necessarily involved not only in "what is"
but also in what "should be. 1I

EVen social scientists are'

47Herman D. Stein, "The Concept of the Social Environ
ment in Social Work Practice," 1n Ego-Oriented Casework:
Problems and Perspectives, ed. by Howard J. Parad and Roger
R. Mlller, Family Service Association of America, New York
(1963), pp. 65-66.

48 s . Z. Hasan, "Concepts and Methods in Soclal Work
Research," in Cora KasiuB, ed. New Direction in Social -Work
(New York: Harper, 1954).
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becoming cognizant of the fact that "neither the body of
knowledge, nor the activities of its seekers, is morally
neutral.,,4g

In addition social workers must seek to uti11ze

scientific knowledge to pursue humanitarian goals.
However, social scientific knowledge has been help
ful to the social worker, and can continue to be.

Applied

soc1al science may help social work, for example, to create
both descr1ptive and prescriptive diagnostic principles and
~

typology of understand1ng of what types of problems can

be handled at various levels of practice.

Social science also

could aid in developing a closer approximation of a concept
of non-pathological processes and a fuller appreciation of
man's potential1ties. 50
Inherent in these contributions are dangers.

Because

of the time lag in the interdisciplinary movement, soclal
workers are likely to borrow yesterday's knowledge.

Also

workers are likely "to endow borrowed knowledge with a
greater degree of certainty than,is granted it by the disci

49 Cohen,

OPe

cit., p. 291.

50James L. Breedlove, "Some Implications of Social
Science for Social Work" (unpublished paper, Apri11960).
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p11ne which originally developed this knowledge. u51

Mr.

Kadush1n c1tes as exemplary the fact that although there are

251 definitions of the word "culture tf ln the literature,
soclal work continues to use the word as though there were
only one possible meaning.

Next, social workers "are 11kely

to borrow a simplified version of the truth, and one falsi
fied to the degree that, it is s1mp11fied. u52
"Inquiry and Policy:

In his article

The Relation of Knowledge to Action,"

Max Millikan addressed himself to the fallacy of sc1entists
who maintain that they can predict complex social behavior.
This is fallacious because science is by definition atom
istic--it must separate and isolate parts of the whole'in
order to analyze and study the phenomenon in question.

Once

something is isolated from the whole, from its social con
text, it most often becomes a completely different phenome
non.

If, for example, it was initially a social phenomenon

it no longer has anything with which to interact, and thus
can be examined only as a static. rather than a dynamic.
Millikan expresses that "after the material has been separ
ated from its context it is then reduced to its lowest
51
Alfred Kadushin, "The Knowledge Base of Soc1al
Work" in Issues in American Soc1al Work, Alfred Kahn, ed.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p,_ 67_
52 Ibid,

'.

p_ 68.
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terms.,,53

The danger of "simplification" follows for gen

eralizations which stem from social science theory and
research; it must be remembered that they remain general
izations. 54 There is the added danger of "confusion of
identifications which seems to be the result of interprofes
alonal borrowing."55
Helen Harris Perlman 56 state~ that part of the problem

1n the use of social science theory is not in the theory but
in social work itself:
Our difficulty is our overwhelming sense of needful
ness--the feeling that somehow we have failed to find
the keys that unlock the right doors to human behavior.
This combines with the hope that someone else hol~these
keys. Once we thought sociology held them; then we
thought psychoanalytic theory held them; now we seem to
think social science holds them. We are not even sure
.what social science consists of, what combined bodies of
knowledge are its constituents and whether all of these:
bodies can claim the rubric "science." But we reach out
avidly, eager to know better in order to do better.
The caveat we must hold before ourselves is against
letting the need blind us~ Words seem to hold magic,
and the use of words like Hcommunication" and "trans
action" and "client system" and "role network" may
infuse us with a heady sense of having something to con
cur with. We can weave word-spells around one .another,
but unless we plumb these words for their particular
meaning, for what phenomena. they express, and then for
what their implications for action ar~, we will find
53Max F. Millikan, "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation
of Knowledge to Action," in The HUman Meaning of the Social
Sciences, ed. by Daniel Lerner (1959), pp. 158-182.
54Stein, "Concept of Social EnVironment," p. 67.
55Kadushin, OPe cit., p. 68.
56Helen Harris Perlman, "Social Work' Method: A
Review of the Past Decade," in The Practice of Social Work, ed.
by Robert W. Klenk and Robert M. Ryan (Belmont, California:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc.), pp. 57-75.
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ourselves disappointed again that what we thought was
gold is dross. Something of this sort has begun to hap
pen in work on family diagnosis. It somehow doe~7not
quite tell us what to do about family treatment.~
The final danger is that borrowed material will re
main in an "undigested lump:
and unused."58

interesting but unintegrated

There has been no systematic attempt on the

part of the social work profession to validate social scien
tific knowledge.

"A seemingly truthful, self-evident hypo

thesis achieves the status of fact by sheer repetition

..

,,59

For example, there is a general acceptance in

the literature of the hypothesis that the client demon
strates high negative ambival'ence when applying for finan
cial assistance.

Howe~er,

research gives -a much firmer

reason to believe that this hypothesis is true for some
client groups but not for others. 60
Kadushin describes that although social work has
some systematized high-level abstractions regarding the
worker's approach to the client, concepts such as accep
tance, non-judgemental attitude, and self-determination, and

57 Ibid., p. 7.
58,Kadushin, 2£. cit., p. 69.
59 Ibid ., p. 48.
60 Ivor Svarc, "Client Attitudes Toward Financial
Assistance--A Cultural Variant," Social Service Review XXX
(1956)pp. 136-'146, in Kadushin, .QE.. cit.
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some broad treatment typologies, such as social therapy, sup
portive treatment and insight therapy, there is an essen
tial difference between the high-level abstraction of self
I
I

determination, for example, and the actual face-to-face
application of this concept in treatment.

Kadushin con

trasts the difference "between knowledge based on exper
ience and casual observation as against knowledge formulated
on the basis of rigorous, critical, systematic examination."61
Essentially, "thete is a gap in the- identification and sys
tematic validation of our knOwledge.,,62
It must be kept foremost in the worker's m1nd that
the primary value of social science content is its relevance
to practice. 63

And if social work is to b.orrow, then the

"test of relevance should be applied within the function and
competence of the social 'work practitioner. 64
.knowledge must be put to a pragmatic test.
useful to social work?

Applied

Is the theory

Does it offer a better explanation

for the material in question?
ter solutions for problems?

Does it suggest new and bet
These questions do not inquire

61Kadush1n, OPe cit., p. 50.

62 Ibid ., p. 51.
63

Stein, "Concept of Social Environment," p.

64 Ibid ., p. 67.

!"'
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of the theory's validity, but they do test the applicability
of the theory to the field of social work. 65 In order to
borrow effectively from the social sCiences, social work
needs first to examine the client's needs, and then to
undertake applied research designed to convert social scien
tific theory into principles of practice.

One of the first

tasks to be accomplished in such research is an analysi-s of
the value implications:

to clarify social work goals in

relation to cultural and/or social scientific values.
Behavior Therapy as Reactive to Traditional, Psychodynamic
Therapy
Essentially behavior modification

wa~

a therapeutic

approach developed in reaction to the so-called dynamic
school.

Earlier in the paper a case was made for the

strong heritage which social work has acquired from this
ffdynamic" school.

Therefore, it would at first glance

appear that the "behavior modification" or "learning theory"
approach might be in contradiction with some of the under
lying assumption of social work.

In order to assess the

therapeutic relevance, however, it is

nece~sary

to examine

first what principles of dynamic psychology the behavior

65Selma Fraiberg" "Psychoanalysis and the Education
of Caseworkers," in Ego-Oriented Casework: Problems and
Perspectives, ed. by Howard J. Parad and Roger R. Miller
(New York: Family Service Association of America, 1963),
pp. 236-258.

32
ists were reacting to; second, the assumptions upon which
they based their reaction; third, how, in fact, they did
react:

what was the nature of the "contradictory" practice

theory?
Behaviorists take issue with five basic tenets of
psychodynamic theory.

Like the medical disease model, the

psychodynamic model incorporated the assumption that mal
adaptive behavior was simply a surface symptom of an under
lying emotional disorder, and that any direct attempt to
modify such behavior must fail or result in substitution
of other symptoms. 66

Coleman is very explicit in his

adherence to the traditional or dynamic viewpoint:
Psychological treatment • • • focuses on (1) helping
the patient to understand the dynamic significance of
his symptoms--how they came about and why he uses them,
and (2) helping him to strengthen his personality and
find more adequate and effective means of dea~ing with
his problems • • • •
The first major obstacle is the resistance of the
patient to being cured. What the neurotic really wants
is to be cured of his symptoms without having to face
his problems or to give up the more or less unconscious
satisfactions which the symptoms obtain for him. Thus
he frequently insists on discussing his symptoms at
great length, seemingly in a sincere attempt to help the
therapist get a clear v1ew of them • • • •

66BruCk, .QE.. cit., p. 39; Florence Hollis, " ••• And
What Shall We Teach? The Social Work Educa tor and Knowledge, "
Social Service Review 42 (June 1968), pp. 195.

/
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In some cases the patient1s symptoms may temporarily
disappear so that he is convinced it is unnecessary to
return for further treatment. For th1s reason the im
mediate disappearance of symptoms is often looked upon
as a poor prognostic sign. In still other cases the
symptoms may seemingly become intensified and the
patient may report that he is becoming worse and has de
cided to consult another therapIst. ThUS, it is often
very difficult to overcome the patient1s resistance to
the actual facing of his problems; yet this is required
in any effective therapy.
A common pitfall in therapy is the treatment of
symptoms rather than underlying personality difficul
ties • • • unless the underlying personality conflicts
are properly handled by psychotherapy the same neurotic
symptoms or others designed t0 defend the patient from
his problems will soon appear. 67
Behaviorists state that Coleman's notion of not
treating the symptom directly ignores the patient's reason
for coming to therapy.

EysenckJ a behaviorist, reports

that, "there is no neurosis underlying the symptom but
merely the symptom itself.

Get rid of the symptom and you

have eliminated the neurosis.,,68

Ullmann and Krasner argue

that,
It seems fairer to use one's scientific and pro
fessional knowledge to help the patient achieve "his n
goal than it is to draw him into a process, even if it
is called self-actualization which the pat ent did not
request and which is not firmly validated. ~

6

67Coleman, ~. Cit., p. 225.
68 Ho J. Eysenck, "Learning Theory and Behavior
Therapy," Journal of Mental Science (1959), in Leonard P.
Ullman and Leonard Krasner, Case Studies, pp. 61-75.
69ullman and Krasner, Case Studies, pp. 40-41 •

.
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Behavior modifiers continue to point out that literature
dealing with the question of whether or not insight 1s a
Bufficient condition for change in actions is replete with
negative instances. 70
Second, the behavior therapists point to the weak
ness in psychodynamic theory of development:

it is essen

tially a conflict theory which assumes that all develop
ment, normal and neurotic, stems from the conflicting
demands of id, ego, and superego.

While neurotic structures

may be formed through these conflicts, normal structures are
not and their development must be explained 1n any adequate
theory of development.

Contrariwise, the behavior modifi

cation people utilize a variety of learning principles like
reward and punishment to account for all behavior.
behaviorist all behavior,

no~al

For the

and pathological, is learned

behavior, and is therefore dependent for its existence upon
past and present reinforcement principles.

As B. F. Skinner

maintained--what is learned is what gets reinforced by the
individual's reinforcing·communlty.

The basic construct

for behavioral psychology is expressed by the equation

B

= f{s)

which means that behavior is some function of the

70
D. D. Cahoon, If Symptom Substitution and Behavior
Therapies: A Reappraisal," Psychological Bulletin 69 (March
1968), pp. 149-56.
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stimulus.

Stimulus comes, in this case, from the external

environment; for even if there were recognizaQ1e stimul1
from inside the 1ndividual they would be discounted by the
behaviorist, because they would not be available for assess
ment by the objective observer.

All behavior is defined as

either respondent, that behavior which is controlled by the
preceding stimulation, or operant, those responses con
trolled by consequent stimulation.
,

'

In addition to not being effective 1n the area of

I

symptom alleviation, the behaviorists argue that the psycho
dynamic therapies are extremely restrictive in their defini
tion of the client population.

Traditionally, attention was

directed to the individual, his motivation and his verbal
skill so that the institutional or soc1al inadequacies were
obscured.

Further, this approach was often less effective

with cl1ents having problems that were socially perceived
71
rather than self-perceived.
Problemmatic were the facts
that those whose personal or cultural characteristics did'
not coincide with the model tended to be excluded, and that
the exclusive focus upon the individual process all but
ignored the social context in which the person and the
problem were embedded.

72 Behaviorists, in opposition,

7lGermain, op. cit., p. 21.

72 Ibid , p. 15.
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dlrect all of their attention to the environment:
which is external to the organism.

to that

Further, they do not

eliminate clients on the basis of their verbal accessibility,
or their capacity for introspection.

Rather, they group

clients into problem areas, some of which they claim greater
success than others, attempt to systematically discover the
way in which the "symptomatic" behavior is being reinforced,'
and treat by altering the system of reinforcement.

They

maintain that all behavior is learned in this way, and
therefore no client is necessarily excluded from therapy.
Following the medical, or disease modal, the psycho
dynamic theories were based upon the idea that the client
was in some way deficient.

Further, the model led to the

categorization of clients in terms of presumed underlying
111nesses.

The behaviorists argue that the psychodynamic

nosology were developed on a descriptive basis and as a
result of socla1 and historical pressures, and that there
fore they were only products of medical sociology rather
than groups based upon the validation of clearly defined
dlseases or definlte patterns of behavior. 73 Behaviorists
agaln maintain that they avoid such "soc ia1 and historical"
pressures:

they do not have an elaborate nosology; rather

73ullman and Krasner, ~. cit., p. 9

37

they look carefully at the symptomatic behavior, what pre
cedes and follows the behavior, and upon the basis of such
information establish treatment. 74

According to Hilgard:

The working behavior therapist is likely to ask
three questions: (a) what behavior is maladaptive,
that is, what subject behaviors should be increased or
decreased; (b) what environmental contingencies ~
rently support the subject's behavior either to maintain
his undesirable behavior or to reduce the likelihood of
his performing a more adaptive response; and (c) what
environmental changes, usually reinforcing stimuli, may
be manipulated to alter the subject1s behavior. 75
Finally is the issue alluded to above:

psychodynamic

terms are badly defined; in fact, operational definitions
are almost entirely lacking.

The dynamiC focus upon

thoughts and feelings makes dynamic
cessible to research methodology.

~heory

relatively inac

The verbatim records,

case studies, of psychotherapy are naturalistic records.
Such records are important for one phase of the de
velopment of science and have the invaluable function of
bringing the scientific observer a reasonably complete view
of the real-life situation that he is encountering.

How

ever, naturalistic records are hard to analyze and, because
of the inability to carry out experimental controls, they

74William R. Morrow and Harvey L. Gochros, "Miscon
ceptions Regarding Behavior Modification," Social. Service
Review Vol. 44 No.3 (September 1970), p. 293.

75 E • R. Hilgard, Introduction to Psychology 3rd ed.
(New York: Harcourt, 1962), p. 614.
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are difficult to use as a basis for the actual confirmation
or disconfirmation or a theory.

Also language of the

dynamic clinicians has been demonstrated to have very low
reliability, and to bear little relationship to the ensuing
treatment. 76 In contrast, behaviorists claim to use no
terms, diagnostic categories nor treatment processes which
cannot be defined operationally:

in phenomenological terms.

Behaviorism, in many ways, was more of a philo
hsophical position than a scientific method. 77 Essentially
the behaviorists combined logical positivism'in philosophy
and operationism in physics to human behavior.

Concepts,

such as mental constructs and processes, which could not be
subjected to empirical study were rejected.

B. F. Skinner

explained that:
• • • "mind" and "ideas" are non-existent entities,
invented for the sole purpose of providing spurious
explanations • • • • Since mental or psychic events
are asserted to lack the dimensions of physical
sCien~8' we have an additional reason for rejecting
them. 1
76Herman' O. Schmidt and Charles P. Fonda, ItThe Reli
ability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A New Look," in Herbert
C. Quay, ed. Research 1n Psychopathology (Princeton, New
Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963; Frederick H. Kanfer and
George Saslow, "Behavioral Diagnosis," in Cyril Franks, ed.
Assessment and Status of Behavior Thera les and Associated
Developments New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1970 •
77Char1es A. Catania, Contemporary Research in
Operant Behavior (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1968), p. 1.
78 B• F. Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour (New
York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 30-31.
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Behavior of the individual was to be manipulated and mea
sured in· a controlled laboratory situation.

Explanation of

behavior was couched 1n positivistic assumptions such as the
atomistic nature of the whole and linear causality.

In ex

planation, the behaviorists proposed to understand all of
human behavior by first understanding simple behaviors and
then combining a number of simple behaviors.

Further the

behaviorists operational assumptions that behavior occurs
lawfully, so that any human problem could be viewed as part
of a chain of cause-and-effect relationships, led to the
consequent idea that the amelioration of problems can and
should be planned.

Being operationally defined and based

upon such empirical behavior principles as the law of
operant reinforcement and the law of extinction, behavtorists
claimed to have an empirically validated practice theory.79.
In summation, behavior modification is a practice
theory based upon social scientific learning theories.
H. J. Eysenck, for example, defined behavior therapy as "the
attempt to alter human behavior and emotion in a beneficial

79H• J. Eysenck, Ex eriments in Behaviour Therapy
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 19
,pp. 0-51; Gordon
Paul, Insi ht vs. Desensitization: An Experiment in
Anxiety Reduction Stanford: Stanford University Press
.1966); Gordon Paul, tlInslght VB. Desensitization in Psycho
therapy Two Years After Termination," Journal of Consulting
Psychology 31 (August 1967), pp. 33-48.
.
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manner according to the laws of modern learning theory.nBa
The behaviorists assume that all behavior is learned, and
is therefore under the control of stimuli from the exterior
environment.

In terms of learning theory, there is no such

thing as pathological behavior that is separate from normal
behavior:
tlnuous.

normal and abnormal behavior are considered con
Influenced by the cultural relativism of anthro

pology, the behavior therapist assumes the position

th~t

behavior is "abnormal" only if it is inappropriate for the
environment in which it occurs.

If it suits the cultural

or subcultural norm, it is adaptive; if not, it is mal
adaptive.

The cause of abnormal behavior is the particular

history of reinforcement of each individual.
Of import is the fact that there is not one modern
learning theory.
The point is that psychologists engaged in behavior
modification make use of a variety of learn1ng theories,
but their actual operations can be describedayith ease
by anyone of a number of learning theories.

80H• J. Eysenck, "The Nature of Behaviour Therapy,"
in Experiments 1n Behaviour Therapy (New York: The Macmil
lan Company, 1964), p. 1.
8lUllmann and Krasner, Case Studies, p. 16.
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For example, behaviorists working with children or hospital
ized clients usually apply terms derived from B. F. Skinner's
work, while workers dealing with adult sexual or neurotic
problems more often utilize terms and concepts derived from
the work of Guthrie. 82
These theories were formulated as a result of experi
mental data collected on cats, pigeons, rats, and monkeys.
Following Darwin's notion that there is biological contin
uity among organisms of similar structure, the principles
developed from laboratory experiments with animals were
applied to humans.

83 Because these applications met with

some success, it was subsequently assumed that human beha
vior followed basically the same laws as did animal
behavior.
Behavior therapy practice follows from the philo
sophical assumptions of logical positivism.

In all methods,

the client's responses are carefully observed before therapy
begins, and the therapeutic plan is then designed specifi
cally to meet the client's specific need.

Very briefly

there are four basic types of behavior therapy now prac
82Bruck, g£. cit., p. 48; L. Breger and J. L. McGaugh,
"Critique and Reformulation of 'Learning Theory' Approaches
to Psychotherapy and Neurosis," Psychological Bulletin (1965)

63:340-343.

83Catania, 2£. cit., p. 2.
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ticed.

The first, and by far the most prevalent within

social work, is called operant conditioning.

Based upon the

postulate that all behavior is controlled by its conse
quences, it exists not only as an independent method, but
also presupposes all other kinds of behavior modification.
Looking at operant conditioning in terms of a formula:
S

~

R

~

R+ is the designation meaning that a stimulus elicits

a response which must be positively reinforced in order for
a response to continue or increase in frequency.

The thera

peutic technique, thus, is one of manipulating the rewarding
or punishing content of environmental stimuli, and is util
ized with children having severe behavioral problems,
autistic children, self-help skills and increased contact
with environment in psychotics and retardates; conversion
reactions, enuresis and speech disorders.
Second, a subtype of "operant conditioning," is
"aversive therapy" or "counter-conditioning. 1f

In counter

conditioning an aversive stimulus is presented simultan
eously with a maladaptive response in order to extinguish,
or weaken it, or an aversive stimulus is removed in order
to negatively reinforce a desirable response which has a
low frequency.

In Borne situations, extinction is accom

panied by the withdrawal of a positive stimulus after a
maladaptive response.

This method has been used in

lng alcoholism and sexual disorders o

treat~
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The method of "negative practice" has also been util
ized in extinguishing maladaptive responses by repeatedly
eliciting them in the presence of neutral or reinforcing
circumstances.

For example, it has been assumed by beha

viorists that UneuroticU behavior was learned because of
anxiety-producing conditions in the environment.

Thus, if

the response is frequently emitted when these conditions
are removed, the nneurotic " response should disappear.
Behavior modification literature describes this technique
as applicable to problem areas such as stuttering, tics,
sexual disorders, and obsessive compulsive reactions.
Finally, there' is the method of "systematic desensi
tization. 1f

Based upon Hull's principle of reciprocal inhi

bition and upon Skinner's development of behavioral shaping
by successive approximations, this process begins with the
construction of a hierarchy of anxiety-producing stimuli.
The patient is placed, next, in a state of extreme relaxa
tion, and stimuli of gradually increased anxiety content
are then introduced.

Fundamental to desensitization is the

postulate that no human being 1s capable of entertaining two
antagonistic feelings simultaneously; that is, one cannot
feel anxious and relaxed at the same time.

In theory, the

relaxed state of the organism is incompatible with an
anxiety state, consequently the inappropriate maladaptive
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responses are ext1ngu1shed. 84
ment choice for

pho~ias

Desens1tization 1s the treat

of all types.

It has also been used

with conversion reactions, anxiety reactions, impotence and
frig1dity, voyeurism, exhibitionism and stuttering.
Critique of Behavior Modification
Negative reactions to behaviorists have been diverse
and numerous.

This paper, however, will only sketch out

three broad categories of criticism.

First is the area of

behaviorism1s assumed value position.

The purely socio

logical "environmentalism" of learning theory has raised a
number of questions as to the nature of man, and the extent
to which he can or cannot be determined entirely by his
milieu.

Von Bertalanffy argued that,

If you manipulate a dog according to Pavlov, a cat
accord1ng to Thorndike, or a rat according to Skinner,
you will obtain the results described by these
authors. That is, you select, out of their behavioral
repertoire, such responses as may be controlled by
punishment or reward, you "make" the animals into
stimulus-response machines or robots. The same, of
course, is true of humans • • • • However, in so doing,
you de-rattisize rats and dehumanize humans • • • •
Psychology in the past fifty years was a fight
against what has been called the "anthropomorphic
fallacy,fI that is, imputing to animals human sentiments

84Joseph Wolpe and Arnold A. Lazarus, Behavior TheraPl
Techniques (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966).
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and capabilities. But it was for~otten that there
equally is a "zoomorphic fallac8~ canceling any dif
ference between animal and man. ~
Erich Fromm expresses his discontent in another direction:
Therapy aimed at nothing but social adjustment can
only reduce the excessive suffering of the neurotic to
that average level of suffer1n§ inherent in conformity
to these patterns • '. • • The adjusted" person in the
sense in which I have used the term here is one who has
made himself into a commodity, with nothing stable or
definite except his need to please and his readiness to
change roles. As long as he succeeds in his efforts
he enjoys a certain amount of security, but his betrayal
of the higher self, of human values, leaves an inner
emptiness and insecurity which will become mane6est when
anything goes wrong in his battle for success.
In a" sense the behaviorist assumes the position of a
technician.

The client's presenting problem 1s "fixed u by

the therapist; however, the client is in no way helped to be
more capable of dealing with the next problem which arises.
Essentially the painful symptom may be alleviated, but the
client is not helped toward growth;

toward understanding,

for example, how he developed the symptom initially.

There

are no value positions, says the behaviorist; all values are
relative to the culture.

Of course if values are relative

to the culture, then they must be relative to the sub
culture within that culture, next they must be relative to

York:

85LUdWig Von Berta1anffy, Robots, Men and Minds (New
George Brazi11er, 1967), pp. 13-15.

86Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1950).

I

1
1

I

46

the groups and sub-groups with1n the sub-culture, and
finally they must be relative to the individual.

For the

behaviorist, theoretically then, there could be no shared
values.

Von Bertalanffy exchanges the word "meaning" for

rrvalues":
Of course, in II verbal behavior" (Skinner, 1957)
within a linguistically full-grown society the conven
tionalpattern of operant behavior and reinforcement
plays a large role. Nevertheless, as Chomsky (1959) has
emphasized in his critique of Skinner's book, learning
by "meaning" or "understanding" is essentially different
from and cannot be reduced to reinforcement. In Skin
ner's scheme, there is no place for a sentence1s being
n true" (i. e., corresponding in some way t.o ff fact"); one
sentence is as good as the other, presupposing it is
sufficiently reinforced. This, also, is correct for
manipulating psychology, the condition1ng of the human
animal through mores, ingra1ned metaphys1cs and pre
judices, mass med1a and the 11ke. It leaves completely
unexplained that there is something like a search for
"object1ve truth" (independent of and frequently contra
dicting reinforcement and animal gratification), that
there is "mean1ng" beyond conditioned response to word
stimuli, that the latter form grammat al patterns accord
ing to laws of symbolic systems • • •

s7

Academic psychologists have difficulty dealing with a
number of things which would seem to be rathe·r essential to
deal with.: 1n a theory regarding human behavior.

They cannot,

for example, speak of eth1cal reality; they have no way to
account for efforts at self-comprehension; there is no way,
80

to speak, for behaviorists to hold their man together:

87Bertalanffy, £E. clt., pp. 26-27.
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for example, where does the individual store his "history of
reinforcement"j how and when does it become pertinent to the
present?

They cannot account for the wholeness of a person

apart from the part processj neither can they deal with
growth and change within a ,context of an enduring identity;
finally, there is no explanation for the concreteness of an
individual's own special experience.
~ion

There is little ques

that behavior modification techniques have proven suc

cessful in the alleviation of many symptoms, and in Von
Bertalanffy's terms that human can be made into robots, but
do we have to follow the direction of an eminent American
scientist who stated that, "We

~

go to the moon, for the

simple reason that we can do it,,?88

If social workers were to subscribe to behavior
therapy as a practice theory there would be value implica
tions.

First, if it were assumed that man was solely a pro

duct of his environment, then the diagnostic process could
have only one direction:

to

und~rstand

a particular indivi- '

, dual, the worker 'need only understand the environmental forces
upon him.

Second, principles such as "self-determination"

would have to be discarded for not only does the therapist
assume complete charge of the process, but egalitarian'ism

88 Rene Dubos, "Second Edition: Does Man Have a
Future," The Center Magazine Vol. IV No.2 (March/April
1971 ), p. 57.
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reigns:

individual differences are simply a result of the

environment.

Finally, social work therapy would consIst

entirely of social action:

if the worker would improve the

man, he must first improve his milieu.
A second group of criticisms centers around the be

haviorist claim of being "scientific."

Behavior modifiers

claim to have "operationalized tl their terms, but what, for
example, is the operational definition for "reinforcement"?
Is reinforcement a concept or a

taut~ogy?

It is appro

priate here to recall Perlman's warning that words seem to
hold magic;
by words.

workers cannot allow themselves to be blinded
Is the behaviorist operational definition of

human behavior satisfactory for social workers?

Finally,

I
I
1
,

1
I

are the behaviorists capable of being as "objective
maintain?
jects?

ft

as they

Can they remain truly separate from their sub

Daniel Yankelovich and William Barrett answer these

questions in the negative:
There is no reality to be measured independently
of the measuring apparatus. If, now, one thinks of the
measuring apparatus as a means of perception, then we
may say that the lesson of modern physics is the subject
(perceiving apparatus) aAd object (the rea11ty measured)
form one seamless whole.~9

89Daniel Yankelovich and William Barret, Ego and
Instinct: The Ps choanal tic View of Human Nature Revised
New York: Random House, 1970 , p. 203.

I
I
J
;
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Carl Rogers questions that anyone can "objectively" know
anything:
Thus, if a physicist says that he uknows" that the
speed of a freely falling object is expressed by the
formula, v = 32t, what he means is that various indi
v1duals, whom he trusts have each gone through similar
operations, which can be precisely described, and have
observed similar results; and each has arrived at a
similar subjective conviction, which is expressed in
the formula, which is understood in a similar manner by
all. The physicist believes the convictions are similar
because he has exercised his own empathic ability in
understanding the communications and the internal frame
of reference of others.90
Finally, the question must be asked, does behavior
modification offer better explanations for the material in
question, or are the answers merely more simplistic and
therefore more easl1y digested?

A number of practice

theories have unfortunately followed Wittgenstein's loglc when
he stated, rrWoven

~

nicht sprechen leann, claruber muss man

nicht schweigen" (Whereof one cannot speak,thereof one must
be silent).

How are practitioners to gr,?w if the unanswered

questions are not clearly stated, and someone does not
attempt their resolution?

Finally, regarding behavior

therapy, social workers might do well to remember Cohen'S
warning:

gOT. W. Wann, ed., Behaviorism and Phenomenology

(Chicago:

University of Chicago, 1964), p. 113.
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Social work, with the help of the social scientiats,
must continue to seek ways of enriching its own knowl
edge and skills from this so~rce. In so doing, however,
it must avoid the danger of mere substitution of soci
,
ology for psychology.9 1
Nature/Nurture:

An

~Old'Debate?

Ostensibly, behaviorism amounted only to a denial
of the doctrine of innate ideas:

that man has an "essence"

of "inner nature n which remains unaffected by the vicissi
tudes of sensory experience.

In actuality, however, be

haviorism's argument with the "traditional" approach was an
offshoot of a much deeper issue--nthe perennial question of
nature versus nurture. u92 Another way which this debate can
be described is through the paradoxes of practice outlined
by Halmos in his book, The Faith of the Counsellors. 9 3
Basically Halmos explicated upon six paradoxes which
he felt were inherent in the therapeutic process:

At the

same time that the therapist was to utilize scrupulously
thought out strategies, he was to act and react with spon
taneous lovingness.

The client was dealt with as though

motivated by supreme rationa11ty and intelligence and/or
91

.
Cohen,

~.

cit., p. 332.

92Richard Lowry, The EVolution of Psychological
Theory (New York: Aldine-Atterton, Inc., 1971), pp. 54-55.
93 p • Halmos, The Faith of the Counsellors (New York:
Schocken, 1966).
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he was impulsively or emotionally motivated.

Therapists

were told to "be-in-charge" at tl'?-e same time that they were
being non-directive.

The therapeutic act was viewed simul

taneously as an act of caring or helping and an application
of science.

Therapists were forced to deal with the paradox

of whether their client learned'by didactic teaching or
insight.

Finally, the worker was taught that the process

had a beginning, middle and end concurrently with the idea
that there was an interminable nature to the therapeutic
relationship.
Behaviorists, in their reaction to psychoanalytic
thought, basically pOinted out that the dynamic model had
addressed itself primarily to only one side of each of
Halmos' paradoxes.

In effect the behaviorists have only

assumed the other side of each pair.

Behaviorism concen

trates upon what the client doesj behavior modification is
completely planned around the establishment of an S-R
bond;9 4 the therapist is ''In charge" of the process;95
emotionality is an unwanted and

unneces~ary

intervening

variable; the process has a beginning, middle and end; and
the process is entirely empirical; it is a direct applica

94U11mann and Krasner, Case Studies, p. 36.
95Morrow and Gochros, ~. cit., p. 302; Wolpe and
Lazarus, £2- cit., p. 17.
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tion of science. 96

The very fact that these theor1es hav~

limited themselves iri this manner

ha~

made each of them In

adequate practice theories.
Each tries to be simultaneously comprehensive and rigor
ous, treating everything and explaining everything.
Neither aim is achieved very well because the extremes
of each position reflect an oversimplified view of human
behavior; translated into the clinical area, this over
sImplifIcation r.equires .psychotherapists to be contin
uously ready to cheat on their systems or on their
intellects if they want to work ve~ well and explain
to themselves what they are doing.~·(

96ullmann and Krasner, Case Studies, p. 37.
97perry London, Behavior Control (New York:
and Row, 1969), p. 56.

Harper
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